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Although several institutional and management approaches that address the 
degradation of the rangelands have been tested in the dry areas of Central and West Asia 
and North Africa (CWANA), impact has been limited. Nonetheless, the development of 
National Action Plans to combat desertification highlights the interest of governments to 
tackle this issue. Payment for Environmental Services (PES) may be a viable policy 
option, though, to date, most PES programs have focused on the management of different 
resources (forests, watersheds). The purpose of this paper is to examine whether PES 
could be a viable option to promote sustainable rangelands management in the dry 
rangelands of CWANA. Specifically, it focuses on the scientific gaps and knowledge 
related to the local and global environmental services produced by rangelands and 
addresses questions related to the beneficiaries of these services. Institutional conditions 
necessary for the implementation of such schemes are discussed.   
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INTRODUCTION 
As the awareness of policymakers, private sector, and civilians for environmental 
sustainability is increasing and the environmental services provided by various ecosystems of 
the planet are better recognized, new economic instruments are being developed to internalize 
these services into market transaction. Payments for environmental services (PES) schemes is 
one of them, operating under the principle that resource users in position to provide 
environmental services - through alternative land management and land use practices - should 
be compensated for the costs of their provision.  
To date, most payment schemes for environmental services have been developed for 
forests protection (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002), biodiversity conservation (Pagiola et al. 
2004), or watershed management (Kosoy et al. 2006), but they are not a common approach 
for rangeland management. Apart from a project
18 that focuses on silvopastoral systems to 
                                                      
1 Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (CIRAD), UPR 
Livestock systems and International Center for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas (ICARDA) – PO Box 5466, 
Aleppo, Syria. Fax: +963 21 221 3490  Email: c.dutilly-diane@cgiar.org   *Corresponding author 
2 International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) – Environment and Production technology Department – 
2033 K Street NW, Washington DC 20006-1002, USA. Fax: +1 202 467 4439  Email: n.mccarthy@cgiar.org 
3 International Center for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas (ICARDA) – PO Box 5466, Aleppo, Syria. Fax: 
+963 21 221 3490  Email: f.turkelboom@cgiar.org   
4 International Center for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas (ICARDA) – PO Box 5466, Aleppo, Syria. Fax: 
+963 21 221 3490  Email: a.bruggeman@cgiar.org 
5 Email: jim.tiedeman@yahoo.com   
6 International Center for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas (ICARDA) – PO Box 5466, Aleppo, Syria. Fax: 
+963 21 221 3490  Email: k.street@cgiar.org 
7 Independent Conservation Biologist, www.gianlucaserra.com, Email: puffo_blue@hotmail.com 
8 Regional (Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua) Integrated Silvopastoral Approaches to Ecosystem Management, 
funded by GEF. 
   CAPRI WORKING PAPER NO. 62              JANUARY 2007           
 
2
improve degraded pasture land in Latin America, the only case known to the authors is the 
Natural Resources Conservation Services (NRCS) Grassland Reserve Program in the USA, 
created in 2002. This voluntary program pays ranchers to restore or protect private 
rangelands. Other projects in the dry rangelands concern the valuation of environmental 
services. In south Texas, Lemberg et al. (2002) combined an ecological, hydrological, and 
economic model to assess the effects of brush control on improved downstream water supply 
in a large rangeland watershed. In Peru, Quezada (2003) conducted a complete economic 
valuation of the biodiversity and environmental services of the High Andean grasslands. In 
Central Asia, the carbon studies component of the Livestock Management and Rangeland 
Conservation Tools project is providing data on rangeland carbon flux (Wylie et al. 2004).  
Fisher et al. (1994) presented evidence that shows that grassland soils can store as 
much as 70 t/ha of carbon, which is similar to forest soils and much more than previously 
thought. Farage et al. (2003) caution that semi-arid lands are particularly susceptible to soil 
degradation and carbon loss, and that management is extremely important in these regions. In 
addition, appropriate management of the rangelands could reduce wind erosion and frequency 
of dust-storms, limit the erosion of flora and fauna biodiversity, and improve water 
productivity. 
While the first assessments of PES programs are being released (Sierra and Russman 
2006; Alix-Garcia et al. 2005; Mayrand and Paquin 2004), this paper conducts a review of 
environmental services provided to rangelands in dry areas of Central Asia, West Asia, and 
North Africa (CWANA) in order to better understand whether Payment for Environmental 
Services could provide an incentive for sustainable management. Unlike many other PES 
schemes that are based on individuals undertaking investments or changing management 
techniques using their own asset base, most of the rangelands in the semi-arid and arid areas   CAPRI WORKING PAPER NO. 62              JANUARY 2007           
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of the CWANA region are common-pool resources, meaning that local institutional 
development as well as the national political and legal framework will be instrumental in 
evaluating both the costs and benefits of rangeland PES schemes in the region. Determining 
just who bears those costs and receives the benefits can be quite a difficult task. Thus, given 
the common-pool nature of the resource, any evaluation must take into account the incentives 
and capacity to manage the resource base as well as to provide the investments needed to 
generate public goods in these areas.   
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AND SERVICES 
Rangelands in the drylands of the CWANA region
9 can be defined as non-arable land, 
i.e. those areas not suitable for crop production due to low (less than 200mm) and highly 
variable rainfall, shallow soils, a high percentage of rocks, steep slopes, or a combination of 
these characteristics. The indigenous vegetation is mostly grass or grass-like plants, and 
shrubs not dominated by trees (Forage and Grazing Terminology Committee 1992). These 
rangelands contribute to the livelihoods of some of the poorest and most vulnerable 
communities in the world primarily by providing grazing for livestock.  
Rangelands are estimated to cover 555 Mha of West Asia and North Africa, 
constituting 90 percent of the estimated degraded drylands (Lal 2002), with an additional 240 
Mha in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In Algeria, studies of the steppe show a regression of 
plant cover of over 50 percent and the productivity of alfa steppes has been reduced by 4 for 
degraded grazing and by 50 percent for palatable grazing since the 1970’s (Aidoud and 
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Nedjraoui 1992 ). In Morocco, Boulanouar et al. (2000) estimated that 80 percent of the 
rangelands are moderately degraded, while about 12.5 percent are severely degraded.  
Beside these figures from North Africa, information on rangeland degradation is 
scattered and incomplete, representing a formidable constraint to the development of 
environmental services markets in the region. Therefore, a first important task is to develop 
land degradation monitoring and prediction tools, which, together with the development of 
mitigation options, are three key elements in the current national action plan to combat 
desertification (UNCCD 2001). However, there are many challenges: 
•  Many dryland ecosystems are inherently non-equilibrial, meaning that changes do not 
progress in a gradual and orderly manner from pioneer to climax vegetation 
assemblages, and evidence of global climate change makes the task of assessment 
more difficult.  
•  Monitoring desertification requires aggregating a number of indicators, but there is 
still disagreement about which set of indicators to use (Squires 2001). 
•  Even where rangeland specialists agree that a rangeland can be characterized as 
degraded, specialists, as well as herders themselves, can disagree on the causal factors. 
Given such uncertainty, identifying concrete management options that both service 
providers and purchasers agree would lead to greater services is likely to be very 
difficult. 
Nevertheless, in general, scientists agree that rangelands are degrading and that 
improved management is extremely important in this region. Four main public services could 
be provided by well-managed rangelands.  They include: 1) carbon sequestration, 2) 
conservation of biodiversity in situ and in adjacent agro-ecological zones, 3) wind-erosion 
reduction, and, finally, 4) improved water productivity and flood erosion control. Below, we 




According to the 1995 IPCC estimates, rangelands may play an important role in 
sequestering atmospheric carbon (Allen-Diaz et al. 1996), especially through the large size of 
these rangelands. World grasslands store anywhere between 200 to 420 Pg C yr
-1 in the total 
ecosystem, a large part of this being below the surface (Robert 2001). If the carbon 
sequestration on optimally grazed lands is greater than on unmanaged lands (un-grazed or 
over-grazed lands), the effects are inconsistent given the diversity of ecological conditions 
(Smith et al. 2006). 
Data on carbon sequestration potential of rangelands are rare in the CWANA region. 
Lal (2002a) estimated that the soils of WANA have a potential annual C sequestration rate of 
200-400 Tg C yr,
-1 accounting for 20 percent of the potential of global dryland ecosystems. 
Among several technical strategies proposed by the author, desertification control offers a 
potential C sequestration rate of 40-100 Tg C yr
-1. In Northen Kazakhstan, Wylie et al. (2004) 
estimated that rangelands in this ecoregion had an average of 1.27 Mg C/ha sequestration of 
CO2 during the 2000 growing season. More data are being analyzed to close the annual 
carbon budget for the Kazakh steppe. 
Enhanced biodiversity  
Biodiversity provides an agro-ecosystem with the ability to adapt to changes in the 
environment. A healthy rangeland maintains a high biodiversity not only of the plant species 
but also of the whole food chain.  
Plant biodiversity 
Three factors are considered to be the major causes of lost plant biodiversity on 
rangelands: overgrazing, collection of woody species for fuel, and conversion to cropland.   CAPRI WORKING PAPER NO. 62              JANUARY 2007           
 
6
With overgrazing, the more palatable plant species disappear, and the less palatable or 
unpalatable species remain filling in the gaps and empty niches (West 1993). Uprooting or 
cutting of woody species for fuel destroys the microenvironment in which other species 
flourish. Invader plants dominate overgrazed rangelands and fill in the voids left by the 
suppressed palatable plants, replacing the diverse biotic-rich native plant communities. 
Resulting monocultures create their own self-sustaining environment.  
As farming becomes more mechanized and population pressure increases, rangeland is 
ploughed and converted to crop land, destroying the protecting vegetative cover. In these 
harsh environments, the soil becomes prone to erosion, and within a few years the land is 
abandoned, reverting back to rangeland. However, once destroyed by cultivation, native 
species are slow to return, and the vegetation often consists of only a few native weedy 
annuals. It is nearly impossible to replace the once rich biodiversity by re-seeding or 
restoration with currently available technology; the rich native biodiversity is permanently 
lost once rangeland is cultivated. Syria is the only country in the region that attempted to 
address this issue in 1995 by banning the cultivation of lands below the 200 mm precipitation 
isohyet (a line drawn on a map connecting points having equal rainfall at a certain time or for 
a stated period). Yet, most of the land remains devoid of protective native vegetation.  
The cost of rangeland degradation and desertification can also be measured in terms of 
the loss of valuable biodiversity in adjacent agro-ecological zones. This impact is particularly 
worrying in the Central Asia and Caucasus region, the location of two Centers of Plant 
Diversity. Although many crops do not originate in the rangelands per se, their diversity is 
affected by the status and use of the rangelands within the context of the broader agro-
ecosystems within the region. Over-grazing and mismanagement leads to a decline in plant 
biomass production and, thus, in the ability of rangelands to provide feed for animal   CAPRI WORKING PAPER NO. 62              JANUARY 2007           
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production. As this occurs, demands for cultivated supplementary feed on adjacent agro-
ecological zones, which contain valuable agro-biodiversity, are increased. This leads to 
genetic erosion as the grazing pressure increases in these areas. Evidence of genetic erosion in 
a heavily grazed range transition zone was observed in 2001 in southeast Azerbaijan by an 
ICARDA-led plant collection mission (N.I. Dzyubenko, pers. comm.). The frequency of 
pasture and medic species within eight genera had decreased from 72 in the 1920s to 35 in 
2001 (Table 1).  
Table 1--Genetic erosion of pasture species in southeast  Azerbaijan  
Species observed in Species observed
the early 20














The degradation of the vegetation cover also affects the whole food chain of the 
ecosystem, from the herbivore insects to the insectivorous birds and the large-sized mammal 
species (gazelle, caprines). Destruction and degradation of habitats through human activities 
is the single most serious threat to fauna world-wide and is the cause of 85 percent of globally 
threatened bird species (BirdLife International 2004). The Northern Bald Ibis (Geronticus 
eremita), a bird considered to have disappeared from Syria more than 70 years ago and 
recently re-discovered in the country (Serra et al. 2003), could be considered an excellent 
ecological indicator for the rangelands of Syrian (Al Badia). This bird species is listed as   CAPRI WORKING PAPER NO. 62              JANUARY 2007           
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globally critically endangered (IUCN 2003); only five adults presently survive in Syria – the 
last survivors of the whole eastern population once occurring in Southern Europe and the 
Middle East. The Northern Bald Ibis is an insectivorous colonial bird and was very common 
within the whole Al Badia until only 15-20 years ago. Although habitat degradation is not the 
only direct cause for the almost extinction of this species from al Badia (heavy human 
disturbance and uncontrolled hunting being among the key others), the time frame of its 
inexorable decline coincides with the beginning of the heavy degradation of vegetation cover 
of al Badia (Serra et al. 2003). 
The erosion of flora and fauna diversity can be stopped and even the biodiversity can 
be improved through rangeland rehabilitation. The rangelands of al Talila reserve, 30 km 
south-east of Palmyra in Syria, offers an interesting example. After the land had been 
protected from sheep grazing for about a decade, the difference in vegetation cover and in 
occurrence and density of fauna species inside versus outside the reserve is stunning. For 
instance, during a three-year bird survey, five species were found only inside the reserve, 
while four others were detected at significantly higher rates inside the reserve versus outside 
of it (Serra et al. 2005). For ground-dweller animals the comparison is more significant: 
several mammal and reptile species are found only inside al Talila (G. Serra, pers comm.). 
Wind erosion reduction 
According to the Global Assessment of Human Induced Soil Degradation (GLASOD), 
most of the wind erosion occurs in Africa and Asia, affecting an estimated 310 Mha. Wind 
erosion is the result of climatic variations and human activities such as the cultivation of 
marginal dry areas, fuel and fodder collection, overgrazing and trampling by animals, and off-
road vehicle use (Middleton and Thomas 1997). Wind-blown dust can be transported over   CAPRI WORKING PAPER NO. 62              JANUARY 2007           
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short to very long distances and affects local communities as well as distant countries and 
continents in several ways: 
•  Soil nutrients transfers: Wind erosion can remove the fertile topsoil and reduce soil 
depth, which can result in a shift to less desirable plants. On the other hand, deposits 
of wind-blown soil can contribute to soil fertility and furnish essential nutrients. 
Usually wind-blown sediments are more fertile than the surface of the parent soil 
(Reynolds et al. 2001). 
•  Damage to agricultural production systems: Heavier sediments, which move by 
saltation, can damage crops, and excessive deposits can bury plants. A coating of dust 
has been found to increase leaf temperatures and water loss, while decreasing intake of 
carbon dioxide by plants. In China, for example, millions of dollars are annually lost 
from the reduction of grain production, decline of quality of vegetables and fruit, and 
drop in number of silkworm cocoons (Northcut 2001), while in North Africa several 
oases are buried (Sivakumar et al. 1998). 
•   Ecological impact: By one estimate, anywhere from about 990 to 1,650 tons of soil 
dust enter the world’s atmosphere each year. In fact, dust in the air has been identified 
as one possible suspect in atmospheric instability and climate change (Northcut 2001). 
Bacteria and fungi, which are transported in plumes of dust from the Sahara across the 
Atlantic, are suspected to cause sea fan disease in the Caribbean coral reefs (Shinn et 
al. 2000). On the other hand, in-cloud photochemical reduction of desert dust can be 
an important source of bio-available iron, which can result in phytoplankton blooms in 
oceans (Saydam and Senyuva 2002). 
•  Health: Dust storms increase the risk of human health-related problems. In Australia, 
it is estimated that 20 percent of asthma problems are linked with wind-borne dust 
(CSIRO 2000). Animal health can also be affected by dust.  
•  Habitation, infrastructure and industry: Poor visibility causes road accidents, 
diversion of flights, and closing of businesses and schools, while wind sedimentation 
can bury roads, fences, railways and other structures. Airborne dust can work its way 
inside mechanical and electrical components, adding to the costs of maintaining 
equipments. Another economic impact is the moving of North African real estate to 
Bermuda (Northcut 2001). 
Research has shown that the frequency and severity of dust storms can be reduced to 
almost negligible proportions through proper management practices. However, to achieve 
sustainable impact, there is a need for a combination of political, social, biological, economic, 
educational and engineering approaches (UNCCD 2001).   CAPRI WORKING PAPER NO. 62              JANUARY 2007           
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Improved water productivity  
The natural range vegetation in the dry environments of WANA, both annual and 
perennial, is well adapted to survive long periods of drought and to capture the limited but 
sometimes intensive rainfall.  
Degradation of the vegetative cover of the rangelands, leaves a large percentage of the 
soil bare. The unprotected soils are affected by sealing and crusting, properties that are found 
in many soils in the dry areas (Levy et al. 1986). Rain falling during small and low intensity 
events will evaporate from the hard, bare soil surface or puddles without any productive use, 
whereas high-intensity and long-duration events will cause surface runoff and flash floods. 
These surface flows collect in wadis, inland salt sinks or surface depressions, from which the 
water evaporates back to the atmosphere or infiltrates to recharge the groundwater such as the 
Nubian Sandstone aquifer below the deserts of Egypt, Libya, Sudan, and Chad (FAO et al. 
2003). 
The surface runoff also detaches and transports soil particles and valuable nutrients 
from surface soils, with the fine particles (silt and clay) being carried along with the water to 
finally settle in depressions. These silts and clay will seal the surface of these ponds, thus, 
reducing groundwater recharge and increasing the loss of local water resources to 
evaporation.   
The main effects of micro-catchment water-harvesting systems and vegetation 
restoration would be the reduction of flooding and erosion, and improved local rainfall water 
productivity. Groundwater recharge is likely to be a minor component. To truly improve 
groundwater recharge, macro-catchment water-harvesting techniques such as check dams, 
infiltration basins, and recharge wells are needed (Bouwer 2002). Whatever interventions are   CAPRI WORKING PAPER NO. 62              JANUARY 2007           
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made to improve the local water use, any potential effects on downstream water users need to 
be considered.  
BENEFICIARIES AND MARKET DEVELOPMENT  
Better rangeland management will have impacts at a range of levels, from a global 
impact by generating environmental services, which we have seen could be quite substantial, 
to a local impact. We first consider the beneficiaries, then examine issues of market 
development as evaluating the services produced and identify the likely purchasers of 
environmental services. We finally focus on the impacts PES development could have on the 
providers and the rangeland population.  
Multi-scale beneficiaries 
Some environmental services will benefit the global population (global good), whereas 
others will benefit specific groups at regional and local scales (Table 2).    CAPRI  WORKING  PAPER  NO.  62                  JANUARY  2007   
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Table 2. Principal benefits and beneficiaries of sustainable rangeland management at various spatial scale. 
Scale Environmental services supplied Benefits Beneficiaries / demanders Monitoring
Increased carbon sequestration Mitigation of global climate change International community / 
countries, private companies
Soil sampling, eddy flux towers, static 
chambers, vegetation cover by remote 
sensing
Global scale Enhanced plant and animal 
biodiversity
Enhanced resource base for future 
generation 
Conservation groups, tourism 
industry, private companies
Survey of key eco-indicators
Dust storms reduction Improved health, decreased maintenance 
costs in infrastructure and industry, 
decreased damages in agricultural 
production systems.
Tourism industry, urban 
populations, government
Remote sensing
     National scale Increased aquifer recharge  Increased water availability Water users Groundwater levels, groundwater use
Flood reduction Decreased damage of infrastructure 
(roads, reservoirs), crops and houses.
State (public insfrastructure), 
utility companies, downstream 
population
Stage heights at hydraulic structures, 
reservoir siltation, infrastructure damages 
              Local scale Increased water productivity
Decrease of soil degradation Conserve livestock productivity  Local herders
Biomass survey, soil sampling, stocking 
rate monitoring




The primary beneficiary of carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation would 
clearly be the “world” population (including future generations).  
Other environmental services such as reduction of wind erosion and sedimentation are 
beneficial at both the local and regional scales. Reducing wind erosion will benefit the 
population living in and from rangelands; in addition, small population numbers and less 
infrastructure susceptible to damage implies that the off-site impacts, particularly dust, may 
far exceed the on-site impacts (Piper 1989).  
Water related services are probably those that offer more balance between on-site and 
off-site benefits, though it still depends on the individual case in question. Improved 
vegetative rangeland cover will increase in situ rainfall water-use efficiency by turning the 
rain into biomass, while the reduction of floods will decrease infrastructure and cropland 
damage downstream. Groundwater recharge interventions could provide water for local 
communities, or the water could be pumped and piped to more remote villages and towns.  
Environmental valuation  
Once the beneficiaries are identified, ecosystem services will have to be valuated to 
facilitate the development of markets. However, because of the inherent spatial and temporal 
variability of the natural processes involved, and the interdependent and the intangible nature 
of such services, putting a value on them is difficult (Turner et al. 2003). Today, two 
conflicting methods are mainly used (Farber et al. 2002): i) the ecological valuation methods 
that take into account the internal structure of ecosystems and derive value by a cost-of-
production approach, but neglect the consumer preferences, and ii) the economic valuation 
methods, which are based on consumer preferences and combine a set of cost-benefit, hedonic   CAPRI  WORKING  PAPER  NO.  62          JANUARY  2007     
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pricing, and contingent valuation methods (Costanza et al. 1997; Bienabe and Hearne 2005) to 
approach the different environmental values. These systems neglect the ecological 
interdependencies.  
Furthermore, both evaluation systems do not capture the normative and ethical aspects 
of the ecosystem valuation. In addition, merging the three aspects of nature, economy, and 
society is the current challenge of valuing ecosystem services (Winkler 2006).  
Market development 
Carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation are global public goods; their 
consumption cannot be attributed to well-identified beneficiaries. Nonetheless, growing 
public awareness of the benefits of these goods has meant that governments, international 
NGOs, and private companies are now paying for these services. All the CWANA states, 
except Iraq, have ratified the Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), the 
convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD), and the Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), which are necessary for governments in order to access international support for 
providing such services. The Kyoto protocol has first been ratified by the Central Asia and 
Caucasus, and lately by the WANA countries (7 countries of the region have not ratified it). 
The current Kyoto Protocol favors the emerging economies of the Central Asia region, while 
the WANA rangelands are not eligible under the Clean Development Mechanism.
10 
                                                      
10 Markets for carbon sequestration have emerged since the Kyoto protocol signing in 1997. Rangelands in 
CWANA qualify under 'Grazing Land Management - Re-vegetation of semi-arid and arid lands with shrubs or 
grasses', which is not eligible under the Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM for Land Use, 
Land Use Change, and Forestry (LULUCF) is limited to afforestation and reforestation activities in the first 
commitment period (2008-2012). However, some Central Asian countries are eligible, as “economies in 
transition” under Joint Implementation (JI). For the WANA countries, the second window of the BioCarbon 
Fund will explore options for Emission Reductions through the CDM through activities other than afforestation 
and reforestation. They are, therefore, not eligible for Kyoto credits in the first commitment period, but may be 
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Parallel to the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM, a voluntary market for carbon offsets is 
emerging, where public or private organizations exchange carbon credits for reasons other 
than regulatory compliance (Taiyab 2005). Although this market is small, based on highly 
variable prices (from USD 5 to USD 35 per tCO2), and lacking transparency and standards, it 
is growing rapidly and could represent a good alternative for the WANA countries. 
Unlike carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation, there are tangible, negative 
externalities associated with wind and water erosion, where “upstream” users affect 
“downstream” benefits, which creates a likelihood of downstream beneficiaries having greater 
incentives to pay for services to reduce wind and water erosion. Additionally, downstream 
benefits can be both “private” (improved health, less costly expenditures on privately-owned 
mechanical equipment and crops, more valuable tourism industry) and public (less costly 
maintenance of infrastructure), meaning again that identifying “demanders” may be easier 
than the case with either carbon sequestration or biodiversity services.   
Finally, different environmental services may not be complementary, i.e. increased 
investment in providing one service may have a negative impact on other environmental 
benefits. For example, rehabilitating rangelands through shrub plantations may increase 
carbon sequestration, but have negative side effects on biodiversity. However, it might also be 
possible to bundle environmental services (Landell-Mills et al. 2002); combining services for 
financing might help to avoid this problem. In addition, if single environmental benefits are 
relatively small on the national scale, merging them could increase the chance of funding in 
the global arena and increase the payment each provider will receive. Finally, merged bundles 
(environmental services sold together that cannot be divided among different purchasers) may 
induce a reduction in transaction costs.   CAPRI  WORKING  PAPER  NO.  62          JANUARY  2007     
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Impact on local population 
PES programs are not poverty reduction programs, but their implementation can have 
a positive impact on reducing poverty when the program is well planned (Pagiola et al. 2005). 
Potential benefits can be directed through three main channels: i) increase in local 
environmental benefits themselves, such as reduced wind erosion, groundwater recharge, and 
flood prevention, ii) local indirect benefits on livestock productivity generated by healthier 
and better managed rangelands, and iii) payments made to the environmental services 
providers.  
Generally, provision of certain ecosystem services may generate both costs and 
benefits.  For instance, creation of reserve grazing lands or enforcing seasonal stock limits 
may lead to greater forage productivity and greater diversity of forage species on restricted 
rangelands, which in turn will lead to improved animal productivity as well as reduced 
vulnerability to climate events.  However, herders may also suffer losses due to reduced 
access to various range resources while the range is regenerating, and losses from increased 
grazing pressure on remaining rangelands can be quite high. The net impact will be a function 
of the options available to reduce rangeland degradation and, in many cases, trade-offs are 
likely (Section 5.2). Additionally, even net benefits are likely to differ widely among 
communities and household members.  
 
PES Implementation: Some Institutional Issues 
Before addressing issues related to the provision of environmental services, this 
section considers some institutional issues that will have to be addressed in the 
implementation of a PES scheme.  First, property rights will have to be clarified in order to 
identify who will be the potential providers of environmental services and therefore the   CAPRI  WORKING  PAPER  NO.  62          JANUARY  2007     
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payment receivers. Then, transactions costs resulting from matching the supply and demand 
side will have to be managed.  
Land tenure 
Rangelands in these semi-arid and arid areas are generally under some form of state 
and, sometimes, tribal tenure. Very little is “private” in a conventional, freehold tenure sense.  
As many authors have noted, the capacity to spread climatic risk by having access to a wide 
range of pasture resources implies that non-private tenure arrangements are likely to be 
preferred by livestock owners – and, importantly, others who have secondary (or “weaker”) 
claims to various resources found on these rangelands (Goodhue and McCarthy 1999; Niamir-
Fuller 1999). There may well be significant trade-offs in designing payment mechanisms that 
recognize and accommodate various rights holders.  
We can draw insights, however, from several institutional approaches that have been 
applied in CWANA. These can be classified into three main approaches (Ngaido et al. 2002): 
i) state appropriation that implies the revoking of tribal control (with traditional institutions 
continuing to operate informally and manage range resources) (Rae 2000), ii) control by 
pastoral communities/organization that consists of giving pastoral communities different 
degrees of control over the access, use, and management of resources, and iii) formal titling of 
tribal collective land which provides the tribes with a legal basis for a wide range of property 
rights.  
These different experiences have had limited impacts on halting rangeland 
degradation; either over-use or under-investment continue to plague these many areas. Taking 
land directly out of production by the state is usually very expensive since monitoring and 
enforcement costs tend to be very high. Promoting “group” ownership tends to reduce herd   CAPRI  WORKING  PAPER  NO.  62          JANUARY  2007     
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mobility and is made difficult by the fact that identifying who belongs in the “group” is often 
quite complex.  Different clans or sub-clans may have different degrees of access rights to 
certain range resources; one sub-clan may have what could be considered primary rights, with 
others’ having secondary claims that are exercised, for instance, in time of drought (Ngaido 
and McCarthy 2002).  
Thus, PES programs and projects must consider the nature and extent of overlapping 
property rights in these areas, and different contracts can be structured to provide services 
depending on the underlying property rights.  For instance, in certain highly degraded areas 
where large investments are required or where specific areas of land generate very high 
environmental services, PES contracts could be structured to pay current rights holders for 
restrictions or prohibitions on land use under a more traditional state managed arrangement 
(Ngaido et al. 2002). This strategy is not likely to be cost effective over large land areas that 
may be demarcated as local tribes managed land or even co-managed by state and local users.  
Instead, combinations of different tenure systems operating over the relevant spatial scale may 
enable both an equitable and efficient solution. There is a great deal of interest in many 
drylands regions to promote innovative property rights systems that enable flexibility in 
access and use while maintaining or increasing incentives to invest in this vital resources. PES 
contracts thus need to take into account the value of the current property rights systems in 
order to develop mechanisms and promote investments that give added-value to the 
rangelands where possible, and consider options for substituting land use and management 
practices only in strategically important areas.   CAPRI  WORKING  PAPER  NO.  62          JANUARY  2007     
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 Transaction  costs 
Considering the interaction between local communities and potential purchasers, there 
are three broad classes of transaction costs involved with implementing PES programs: search 
and negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement costs. As outlined in Scherr et al. (2004), 
transactions costs can be very high, and often lead to extremely reduced payments actually 
going to providers in the case of forest-based projects (Niles et al. 2003 cited in Scherr et al. 
2004).  Below we consider such transactions costs in the context of rangelands. 
Search and negotiation costs 
Search and negotiation costs are those arising from identifying a source willing to pay 
for environmental services and negotiating a contract with that source. Without some 
centralized clearing-house of information, search costs are likely to be very high, particularly 
for more isolated, poorer communities where members have limited education and experience 
dealing with outsiders. Negotiation costs will also be a function of the legal framework under 
which such contracts are made, plus the extent of bureaucratic procedures that need to be 
followed in order to secure PES contracts. Networks of local actors are likely to be very 
important in reducing search and negotiation costs. 
Monitoring costs 
Both the agent purchasing the environmental services as well as the local community 
will face monitoring costs; the distribution of such costs will likely be a negotiating point 
itself and its level will certainly depend on how difficult it is to verify compliance. Monitoring 
activities are of two types:  
1.  Assessing land change in order to verify that appropriate investments or management 
practices have been made. While increased reforestation/afforestation projects might be 
easy to verify, costs of verifying that changes in management actions have taken place are   CAPRI  WORKING  PAPER  NO.  62          JANUARY  2007     
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likely to be very high for most programs. In the USA, government managers of PES 
schemes are particularly concerned about payments tied to change in management 
practices and/or change in use of variable inputs, as these are both extremely difficult to 
monitor. In addition, debates still rage about the causality between different management 
strategies (e.g. managing grazing pressure) and biomass, particularly in the semi-arid and 
arid regions (Vetter 2004).  
2.  Assessing the impact of land use change on the level of provision of ES in order to 
evaluate the economic benefits for the purchasers. The lack of information to link changes 
in practices to increased provision of environmental services remains as the “Achilles 
heel” for most PES programs (Pagiola et al. 2002). 
      Moreover, both monitoring activities will differ by environmental services provided          
(Table 3):  
y  Carbon sequestration: Several advances in measurements of soil carbon pool have 
been made so that it can be implemented in a cost-effective manner (Lal 2002b).  In 
addition, carbon pool can be monitored at regional scale using remote sensing of the 
vegetation cover and land use change (given the limits presented above).  
y  Wind erosion: Assessing the economic impact of dust storms on crop, human and 
animal health, the economy and environment is very complex and difficult to quantify. 
According to Squires (2001), it will take several more years to prepare the necessary 
information to precisely asses the situation.  
y  Water: Siltation of reservoirs and damage to infrastructure can be used as indicators of 
changes in run-off and water erosion due to improved rangeland management. 
However, the extent of this damage is also affected by the highly variable rainfall. 
Changes in groundwater recharge can be assessed by measuring groundwater levels 
and water quality with a network of wells or piezometers, although, actual 
quantification of groundwater recharge is very difficult, because aquifer properties are 
often highly variable and are rarely isolated units (De Vries and Simmers 2002). 
Furthermore, process-based simulation models could assist with an evaluation of the 
effect of land management changes on potential change in the system. 
y  Biodiversity: The biodiversity of a certain natural environment can be assessed 
through the regular monitoring of key ecological indicators. These indicators can be 
flora or fauna species either strictly associated with particularly valuable habitats or 
playing a key ecological role in the functioning of the whole ecosystem. Monitoring 
flora and fauna eco-indicators can be carried out by members of local communities or 
technicians from government institutions or from NGOs, if suitably trained and 
equipped. 
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Table 3--Benefits, costs, and returns of management options for range improvement. 
Controlled grazing Controlled grazing 
+ shrub plantation
Controlled grazing 





Increased carbon sequestration X XX XX XX
Plant biodiversity XXX XX XX XX
Animal biodiversity XX XXX XXX XX
Reduced wind erosion  XX XXX XXX XX
Increased aquifer recharge  X X X X
Flood reduction X X XX X
Increased water productivity X XX XXX XX
Decreased soil degradation X X X X
Increase of plant biomass XX XXX XXX XXX
Local returns (animal productivity)
First returns (years) 1-3 2-3 2-3 3-5
Variability of returns XXX X X XXX
Costs
Investment (capital) X XX XXX X
Monitoring XXX X X XX
Enforcement XXX XX XX XXX
Supplementary feeding - - - XXX
X: Slight benefit/cost; XX: significant benefit/cost; XXX: large benefit/cost; - : reduced cost  
 
Enforcement costs 
Enforcement costs arise in the case of non-compliance and are related to both local, 
traditional interpretations of property rights as well as the formal legal framework. Those 
engaging in the contract, and the legal framework under which the contract is signed, must 
address the very difficult questions of who has both the responsibility and authority for 
enforcing compliance, what are the punishments for non-compliance, and who has the 
authority to extract punishments.  
Thus, whereas monitoring costs of implementing ES projects might be shared among 
providers and purchasers, enforcement costs are likely to fall almost entirely on the providers.  
In other words, groups will have to create legitimate enforcement mechanisms for ensuring 
compliance amongst group members and bear the full costs of actual enforcement. Costs of 
enforcement are thus likely to increase as the membership size and spatial distribution of   CAPRI  WORKING  PAPER  NO.  62          JANUARY  2007     
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members increases, since both are likely to be associated with weaker social links and greater 
likelihood of multiple, and, perhaps, overlapping authority structures. Similarly, the technical 
provision of environmental services often requires that those with rights to geographically-
defined resources will need to agree and work together. The ability for different individuals to 
“self-select” into the group of providers will be far more limited than is the case, for instance, 
with micro-credit groups. This is true in most cases of management of common resources, but 
it is worth stressing since other authors have already suggested the success of certain “micro-
credit” programs as offering a potential solution to structuring PES contracts in regions with 
communal property rights. 
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES PROVISION  
In this section we consider issues surrounding supply of environmental services. We 
consider several management approaches that have been implemented to address land 
degradation in the rangelands of CWANA, since many of these programs that aim to halt land 
degradation contain activities necessary to generate the PES identified above. Then, we look 
at the individual and collective incentives to provide environmental services under several 
management scenarios. Given that various forms of communal property rights continue to 
prevail at the local level and based on the nature of externalities involved in the provision, 
monitoring, and enforcement of environmental public goods, we expect that collective action 
will play a crucial role in organizing communities to manage the transaction costs associated 
with the implementation of PES. We conclude the section with a discussion on the implication 
of heterogeneity in individual incentives for the design of institutions to enable local people to 




Until now, the principal intervention in the region has been the government-led 
establishment of shrub plantations and rangeland reserves. Extensive areas have been planted 
to fodder shrubs as Atriplex spp. (Gintzburger et al. 2000). After periods of resting, native 
vegetation between the shrubs becomes re-established and produces nearly as much annual 
biomass as the shrubs; the shrubs also serve as a stockpile of both fuel wood and forage, 
where forage is used during drought and dry seasons when no other green grazing is available.  
Such government-led interventions have had limited success in controlling access to 
and use of such rangelands, simply because costs of demarcating and guarding the reserves 
have been relatively high. Without effective grazing management, the plantations revert to 
degraded rangeland. Such restoration is therefore ineffective without a change in the land use 
and management that caused the degradation in the first place. 
To minimize high management, monitoring, and enforcement issues, several shrub-
plantation projects have been implemented where specific social groups, such as extended 
families or pastoral cooperatives, play a key role. Groups are compensated during the shrub-
growing period (2-3 years) based on the opportunity cost of grazing foregone, and thereafter 
the identified group members are guaranteed exclusive use of the areas. Though such 
approaches appear to be much more successful, often a legal framework that would enable 
wide-scale adoption of such approaches is lacking. However, such an approach is quite 
consistent with other PES programs being implemented for different services around the 
world; that is, acknowledgement of the foregone opportunities during initial stages is 
explicitly recognized and assurance of receiving benefits in the future is a key aspect of 
program development and the institutional framework.    CAPRI  WORKING  PAPER  NO.  62          JANUARY  2007     
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Beside range rehabilitation programs, the use of water-harvesting structures, such as 
small earth or stone dikes, to capture rainfall run-off is a complementary approach to 
improving rangelands and to reduce floods. Construction of check dams, recharge ponds or 
wells, or diversions in wadis will slow down the runoff water and will generally improve the 
recharge of water to the aquifer (Yahyaoui et al. 2002).  
The development of a PES program could induce the development of global 
management plans for community rangelands, with the appropriate mix of technologies and 
other management options such as rotational grazing that would guarantee the sustainability 
of the system. This is discussed in the next section.  
Individual incentives and collective provision  
Below, we consider individual incentives to invest and/or change management of the 
natural resource base and the group’s ability to work together to provide these locally 
generated environmental services from local common pool resources 
Individual incentives to undertake any rehabilitation/management of the rangelands 
will depend on the technical options chosen. A better economic analysis of the technologies 
presented above is therefore crucial in order to answer the following questions: Does the PES 
scheme require substantial investment (shrub plantations vs. native rangeland grazing 
management)? If so, are the benefits produced pure public goods, in the sense that all benefits 
accrue to everyone with access rights, e.g. shade bushes planted on common grazing lands? 
Or, are there mixed “private-public” benefits, e.g. flocks from individuals who planted shrubs 
can graze the shrubs? How long will it take for returns to be generated? Where the PES 
program is fully implemented, will such benefits from investment be easily verified, or will 
fluctuating climatic conditions make it difficult to assess the benefits in the short- to medium   CAPRI  WORKING  PAPER  NO.  62          JANUARY  2007     
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term?  Similarly, are individuals’ actions easily monitored, or do fluctuating climate 
conditions or a large spatial scale make it difficult to ascertain the extent to which outcomes 
are related to human activities?  What is the scale and scope of the project, and, thus, how 
many people and/or institutions will need to coordinate, monitor, and enforce the PES 
program?   
Taking as a starting point the vast literature on managing common pool resources 
(Ostrom 1990; Baland and Platteau 1996), we assume that individual incentives are likely to 
favour collective action where the returns to ES investments or changes in management 
practices yield greater returns when more people participate, where such investments produce 
both public and private goods, where monitoring individuals’ contributions is relatively easy, 
where returns to the investment begin to accrue immediately, and where such returns are less 
variable.  
The actual costs and benefits to different investments and management options are 
likely to be context specific. Nonetheless, we propose a subjective classification of 
environmental benefits, implementation costs and returns characteristics for some 
management options based on the inter-disciplinary experience of the authors in countries of 
the WANA region (Table 3). For example, investing in shrubs on the common rangeland is 
easy to verify locally and perhaps even by purchasers; it provides a pure global public good in 
terms of carbon sequestration and a common good in terms of forage produce for animals. 
The group required for such investments may be quite small, but the investment may require 
large up-front outlays, and benefits do not accrue until some time in the future. Reducing 
grazing pressure through controlled grazing is likely to generate pure local and public goods 
in terms of increased bio-diversity, reduced soil erosion, and increased biomass. On the other 
hand, benefits to herders in terms of animal productivity depend on everyone else’ abiding by   CAPRI  WORKING  PAPER  NO.  62          JANUARY  2007     
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the new limits; both monitoring and enforcement costs are likely to be very high in order to 
ensure compliance. The spatial scale of enforcement, plus accounting for all those who have 
periodic access to the rangeland, is likely to increase these costs still further (McCarthy 2004). 
Impacts on future animal productivity are likewise uncertain and variable. Nevertheless, these 
results are illustrative, and a proper economic evaluation will have to be implemented on a 
case basis.   
A last point that will have to be taken into account while planning PES scheme is how 
heterogeneity amongst users is likely to affect individuals’ incentives to comply with PES 
programs. Greater heterogeneity of users is likely to increase the costs of collective action for 
implementing any PES program. Users might differ in terms of what rangeland products they 
rely on (forage, fuelwood, medicinal herbs), in terms of exploitation levels (herd sizes), the 
degree of access, use, management, and exclusion rights (primary vs. secondary or tertiary 
rights holders), in terms of total wealth (those with and without access to outside income), in 
terms of social or cultural backgrounds, etc.  Benefits to various PES programs are likely to 
differ across these different types of users, meaning that negotiating amongst users is likely to 
be quite high.  Determining a schedule of who should receive benefits and how much may be 
quite contentious, though groups may agree that all PES payments be put toward investment 
in provision of other local public goods (wells, schools, health clinics, roads), functioning like 
local administrative revenue. Determining the distribution of costs where investments are 
concerned is also likely to be more difficult in more heterogeneous groups. In the end, 
however, the resulting distribution of costs and benefits to individuals will affect their 
likelihood of actively supporting various PES programs, and thus the costs of monitoring and 




Renewed attention is being given to rangelands and the people dependent on them; 
governments in the CWANA region in particular have shown increased political will to tackle 
the difficult issues of poverty and degradation of the rangelands. Nonetheless, because of the 
social, legal, and economic dimensions associated with non-private ownership of rangelands, 
purely technical options to combat desertification and maintain rangeland productivity are 
more limited than the options available for development in more favourable areas, meaning 
that identifying and evaluating alternative management and institutional options is crucial. 
Here we have considered both the types of gains that can be expected from improved 
management of rangelands, as well as some of the institutional issues that need to be 
addressed if the people living in these environments are to take advantage of PES programs. 
There are indeed potentially very large benefits to be gained from well-managed rangelands in 
the dry areas to both rangeland users as well as society at large, particularly wind erosion 
reduction, conservation of biodiversity, soil carbon sequestration, and improved water 
productivity. Actually, if the per hectare contribution of rangelands to the global services is 
smaller that from forests, the contribution applies to vast expanses so that the total services 
are substantial.   
Other than the important task of quantifying and improving scientific knowledge of 
these various benefits, institutional issues remain. One of the major concerns regarding 
contracts between providers and purchasers in these environments is the underlying property 
rights structure which influences just who the service providers are. To make sure that the 
poor and marginalized groups do not lose their pre-existing rights (be it partial, secondary, or 
fuzzy), effective mechanisms for identifying current rights holders need to be put into place,   CAPRI  WORKING  PAPER  NO.  62          JANUARY  2007     
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perhaps with community members and government officials, and/or local NGO’s or civic 
groups. 
Once the group is established, questions regarding the investment and payment 
schedule, and the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms must be addressed. The 
transaction costs of implementing such a program will be shaped not only by the individual’s 
incentives, but also by the institutional design and the cooperative capacity of the group to 
make and enforce collective decisions. Therefore, local community members are far better 
placed to undertake monitoring and enforcement and to provide at least the first-line of 
conflict resolution mechanisms. To ensure legitimacy and fairness, such conflict resolution 
mechanisms should allow for appeal to non-local mediators and to the formal judicial system. 
Finally, heterogeneity in interests has to be dealt with directly and should be built into the 
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